Steve Stucker and Michelle Stucker v. Summit County (Respondent), Highland Estates Homeowner\u27s Association, Kathy Mears, Dave Rich, Elwayne Daly, and Sue Smith : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Steve Stucker and Michelle Stucker v. Summit
County (Respondent), Highland Estates
Homeowner's Association, Kathy Mears, Dave
Rich, Elwayne Daly, and Sue Smith : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jody K. Burnett; Attorney for Respondent.
Robert Felton; Attorney for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stucker v. Summit County Highland Estates Homeowner\'s Association, No. 920263 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4195
°{^JZ!d^ flu ti)t ®ttafi Court of Spp«ate 
STEVE STUCKER and 
MICHELLE STUCKER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY (RESPONDENT), 
HIGHLAND ESTATES 
HOMEOWNER'S 
ASSOCIATION, KATHY MEARS, 
DAVE RICH, ELWAYNE DALY, 
and SUE SMITH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 920263-CA 
Priority 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding 
Robert Felton, 1056 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Appellants 
Jody K. Burnett 
257 East 200 South 
Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorney for Respondent 
Summit County 
FILED 
JUL 2 21992 
Mary T Noonan 
Clerk o- the Court 
Utati Court of Appeals 
Tin ti)z ®tta6 Court of appeals 
STEVE STUCKER and 
MICHELLE STUCKER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY (RESPONDENT), 
HIGHLAND ESTATES 
HOMEOWNER'S 
ASSOCIATION, KATHY MEARS, 
DAVE RICH, ELWAYNE DALY, 
and SUE SMITH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 920263-CA 
Priority 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding 
H e * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Robert Felton, 1056 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Appellants 
Jody K. Burnett 
257 East 200 South 
Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorney for Respondent 
Summit County 
I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Reference 
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS L 
II. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ii 
III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
1. Cases 
2. Rules 
3. Statutues 
4. Ordinances 
JURISDICTION 
i i 
iii 
i ii 
iii 
1 IV. 
V. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
VI. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, 
VII. DETERMINATIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
2. Course of Proceedings^ 
3. Disposition at Trial Courts 
IX. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
X. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
XL ARGUMENT _ _ 10 
I PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO A BUILDING PERMIT AS A MATTER OF LAW SINCE THE USE 
APPLIED FOR WAS IN STRICT CONFORMANCE WITH THE ZONING ORDINANCE IN EFFECT AT 
THE TIME OF THEIR APPLICATION 10 
II SUMMIT COUNTY IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING STUCKERS A BUILDING PERMIT FOR 
COMMERCIAL USE 15 
III SUMMIT COUNTY"S CHANGE OF USE OF A PLATTED SUBDIVIVSION CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL 
AMANEDMENT OF THE SUBDIVISION CONTRARY TO §57-5-7.1 UCA (1953 AS AMENDED) AND 
§57-5-8 UCA (1953 AS AMENDED) 16 
I V THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SNYDERVILLE BASIN DVELOPMENT CODE (1985) REQUIRING 
A LAND OWNER TO OBTAIN A "CONSENSUS" OF NEIGHBORS CONSTITUTES AN IMPERMISSIBLE 
CRITERION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A BUILDING PERMIT 18 
V PLAINTIFFS' PERMIT WAS DENIED IN AN ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND 
DISCRIMINATORY FASHION 23 
XII. CONCLUSION 27 
i 
II 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
1. Plaintiffs and Counsel 
A. Steve Stucker and Michelle Stucker, 235 East Starview Drive, Park 
City, Utah 84060, Plaintiffs. 
B. Robert Felton of 310 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, 
attorney for Plaintiffs. 
2. Defendant/Appellants 
A. Summit County 
B. Jody K. Burnett of 257 East 200 South, P.O. Box 45678, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84145, attorney for Defendant/Respondents. 
ni 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
1. CASES 
Contracts Funding v. Mavne. 527 P.2d. 1073 (Utah, 1974) 22 
Davis County v. Clearfield Citv. 756 P.2d. 704 (C.A. Utah, 1988) 20.22.26 
Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d. 414,415, (Utah, 1990) 2 
Keith v. Saco River Corridor Commission. 486 A.2d. 150 (Me., 1983) 13 
Mavor and Council of Baltimore, v. Crane. 
354 Md. 198,352 A.2d. 786 (1976) „Jg 
Rollins v. Peterson. 13 P.2d. 1156, (Utah, 1991) 2 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving. Inc.. v. Blomquist. 
773 P.2d. 1382,1385, (Utah, 1989) 2 
Thurston v. Cache County. 628 P.2d. 440 (Utah, 1981) 20,23,26 
Town of Seabrook v. Tra-Sea Corp.. 410 A.2d. 240 (NH, 1979) 13,26 
Ward v. Citv of New Rochelle. 197 NYS 2d. 54 (Sup. Ct., 1959) 16 
Utah County v. Young. 615 P.2d. 1265 (Utah. 1980) £ 
Western Land Equities. Inc.. v. Citv of Logan. 
617 P.2d. 388, 395 (Utah, 1980) 12.14.. 16.26 
Wood v. North Salt Lake. 15 Utah 2d. 245, 390 P.2d. 858 (1964) 15.16.26 
STATUTES 
Section 57-5-7.1 UCA (1953 as amended 1987) 3.16,17 
Section 57-5-8 UCA (1953 as amended 1987) 3,16,17 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended 1989) 1 
Ut. Rules Civ. P. 56(c) 2.15 
ORDINANCES 
A. Development Code of Summit Countv (1977 as amended 1981) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Section 1-6(49) 2.5 
Section 3.11 2,5 
Section 12.1 2,5 
Section 12.3 2.5 
Section 12.18(e)(h) 2.5 
B. Snvderville Basin Development Code (1985) 
(a) 
(b) 
(0 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
(J) 
(k) 
(1) 
(m) 
(n) 
(o) 
Statement of Intent 3.6.11 
Section 1.3 3,6,8.11.13 
Section 4.1 3,6t 7.8.10.12,15,20 
Section 4.9(7) 8 
Section 5.6.1 2,23 
Section 5.6.2 7,23 
Section 5.6.3 2. 7.9.18.22.23.25.26,27 
Section 5.6.3(1-11) 18 
Section 5.6.4 23,26 
Section 5.6.5 23 
Section 5.7.1 23 
Section 5.7.2 23 
Section 5.7.3 6,15.23 
Section 5.7.4 23 
Section 5.7.5
 rr__mmmmTmm, „ . _ _ „ _ 23,26 
IV 
JURISDICTION 
The Judgment which is the subject of this Appeal is a final. Summary 
Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, State of 
Utah (R p.288). The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended 1989). 
V 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment of the District Court entering 
Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint as to all claims 
against Summit County dated December 16, 1991 (R p.289). The remaining 
Defendants in the case were dismissed by stipulation pursuant to an Order of 
Dismissal dated March 24, 1992 (R p.292). Notice of Appeal of Steve and Michelle 
Stucker as to the Order of Summary Judgment dismissing their complaint 
against the Defendant Respondent Summit County was filed April 3, 1992 
(R p.294). 
VI 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment 
dismissing the provisions of Plaintiffs' cause of action that they had a vested right 
to utilize their property for a commercial use in conformance with current land 
use ordinances in effect in Summit County at the time they submitted their 
application for a building permit? 
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2. Is Summit County estopped from denying Plaintiffs a building 
permit? 
3. Did the action of Summit County constitute an amendment to an 
existing subdivision without complying with state statutes? 
4. Does the requirement that any landowner in the Snyderville Basin 
obtain a "consensus of compatibility" from neighbors prior to the issuance of any 
building permit make the consent or "consensus" of neighboring landowners an 
impermissible criterion for the issuance of said permit? 
5. Was the absolute requirement of compatibility found in §5.6.3 of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985) applied to Plaintiffs in an arbitrary 
capricious and discriminatory fashion? 
Standard of Review. This appeal from a Summary Judgment is 
reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the Trial Court's conclusion of 
law. The Appeals Court should construe the record in the light most favorable to 
the Appellants. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving. Inc., v. Blomquist. 773 
P.2d. 1382, 1385 (Utah, 1989). Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Rollins v. Peterson. 13 P.2d. 1156, 1158 
(Utah, 1991). Because summary judgment is j. anted as a matter of law this 
Court is free to reappraise the Trial Court's legal conclusion. Hunt v. Hurst. 785 
P.2d. 414, 415 (Utah, 1990). 
vn 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY 
1. Envelopment Code of Summit County (1977 as amended 1981) §1.1-
6(49); §3.11; Chapter 12; Chapter 13 . . . (Exhibit A) 
2 
2. Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985) Statement of Intent re: 
§1.3; §4.1; Chapter 5 . . . Exhibit B 
3. §57-5-7.1 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). . . Exhibit C 
4. §57-5-8 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).. . Exhibit C 
vra 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs who are the 
owners of a lot in Summit County from dismissal of their complaint to compel 
Summit County to issue a building permit for construction on their lot and 
entering summary judgment in favour of Summit County (R p.280, 288). The 
other named Defendants were never served but filed a Motion to Dismiss and 
entered their appearance in this case. The action was dismissed by stipulation as 
to those parties and no claims or issues as to these individual Defendants are 
asserted in this appeal. 
Plaintiffs - Appellants contend that they had a vested right to obtain a 
building permit for commercial use on their lot; Summit County was estopped 
from denying the permit application and that the denial was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
2. Course of Proceedings. This action was commenced November 29, 
1990 and the Defendant, Summit County, was served. The other parties named in 
the Complaint filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 12, 1991 (R p.39) and the 
action was later dismissed by stipulation as to all of the parties except Summit 
County (R p. 289). On August 7, 1991, the Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment 
(R p. 51). Summit County also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
September 16, 1991 (R p. 153) and filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the 
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Stuckers' Motion and in support of their Motion (R p. 155). The joint Motions for 
Summary Judgment were argued before the Court on October 15, 1991 (R p. 279). 
3. Disposition at Trial Court. No trial was held in this matter. On 
August 30, 1991, the Trial Court issued a minute entry that said "Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment is denied. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
is granted" (R p. 280). The Trial Court gave no basis or reasons for its ruling and 
the Order stated: 
"ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant, 
Summit County's Motion for Summaiy Judgment is hereby granted 
as to all claims made in Plaintiffs' Complaint as against Defendant, 
Summit County, and the Plaintiffs' Complaint as against Defendant, 
Summit County, is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the 
merits, no cause of action. 
It is further ordered that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Defendant, Summit County, is hereby denied" (R 
p. 289). (SEE Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Brief) 
IX 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. Plaintiffs own Lot 225 of the Highland Estates Subdivision, Plat B, 
located in Summit County, Utah (R p.l). The lot is located in a subdivision which 
was filed in October, 1964 (R p.l). Summit County had no Master Plan nor zoning 
ordinance prior to 1977 (R p.2,33). The Restrictive Covenants of Highland Estates 
stated that lots 1-4, 20-25, 80-93 and 225-236 were "commercial lots" (R p. 10). The 
zone change designating this lot as commercial occurred with the filing of the 
plat in 1964. With the filing of the plat, the roads were dedicated and became the 
County's property. 
2. Summit County's first Master Plan was adopted in 1977 (R p. 157). 
Summit County admits that lot 225 was designated as "commercial" at that time 
(R p.33) and retained that classification until 1985, when a new, land use plan for 
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a portion of Summit County was adopted (R pp. 3, 34, 54). The first Master Plan 
and zone change affecting the subject property occurred in 1977 with the passage 
of the first zoning ordinance. 
3. The Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985), as distinguished 
from the Development Code of Summit County (1977 as amended 1981) imposed a 
two class permit system upon the area around Park City and Interstate 80 (R 
p.54). The Development Code of Summit Coimty (1977 as amended 1981) continues 
to be applicable to all other parts of the county. The relevant parts of the 
Development Code, first passed in 1977, are appended to this Brief as Exhibit A. 
Relevant portions of the subsequent Snyderville Basin Development Code are 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
Pursuant to §§12.1, 12.3 and 12.18(g)(h) an Auto Body Shop is a 
permitted use in a commercial zone under the Development Code of 1977 as 
amended 1981 (R pp 24, 25, 29) (Exhibit A, p 5). This is the use for which the 
Plaintiffs sought a building permit from Summit County. The Development Code 
defines a permitted use as "a use of land for which no conditional use is required" 
(Exhibit A, p i §1-6, ^49). 
4. The Development Code of Summit County (1977 as amended 1981) 
protected and guaranteed that property uses which had been designated in 
subdivisions recorded prior to its effective date were vested property rights. §3.11 
states (Exhibit A p. 2): 
"3.11 Subdivision approved prior to passage of code. 
A subdivision which has received preliminary approval from 
the Planning Commission prior to the adoption of this Code shall be 
allowed in any zone, irrespective of zone requirements or lot size, if 
the requirements for final approval in accordance with Summit 
County Ordinance No. 65 had been met and the plat approved within 
15 months of the adoption of this Code". 
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5. The subsequently enacted Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985) 
was effective at the time of the Stackers' application for a building permit. This 
code, again, recognized the vested property rights of lots which had been approved 
prior to its passage. Provisions of this ordinance specifically guarantee that 
subdivisions, planned unit developments or other properties which were approved 
for division and sale prior to 1985 were protected and those properties could be 
utilized in conformance with the previous zoning ordinance or an owner could 
elect to develop them under the new code. These rights were expressed in the 1985 
ordinance in the following sections: 
(a) §1.3 Repeal and Continuing Effect (Exhibit B, p. 1-1) 
Qo) Statement of Intent (Exhibit B, first page after table of contents) 
(c) §4.1 Permits Required (Exhibit B, p 4-1) 
6. The Stuckers purchased Lot 225 from the prior owner, Mr. Jim Lynn 
about March 6, 1990 (R p. 188). In addition to the code provision cited in paragraph 
5 above, the Stuckers, prior to the purchase of this lot, were provided a letter to Mr. 
Lynn from the Summit County Planning Director dated May 24, 1989, which 
stated in part: 
"I personally do not support your proposal to convert your 
ground from commercial (emphasis added) to single family" (R p. 
116). 
Mr. Lynn and the Stuckers were told the property should be used for 
"commercial or multi-family" by Summit County (R p. 116). It should also be noted 
that this lot is located at Silver Creek Junction in Summit County. §5.7.3(b) of the 
1985 Code states that commercial development is encouraged to be located at 
Kimball Junction, Silver Creek Junction and Park West Resort (Exhibit B, §5.7.3 
at pp 5-17 and 5-18). 
7. The Summit County Planning Commission refused to allow the 
Stuckers request for a building permit under the "old code" as provided for in §1.3 
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of the Statement of Intent of the 1985 Revisions (R p.58). The Stuckers then 
requested a Class I permit pursuant to §4.1 of the 1985 Code in that they were a 
permitted, commercial use "within a subdivision platted and recorded prior to the 
adoption of this code * * *". That request was denied and they were forced to 
proceed for a Class II permit. 
8. The Plaintiffs were also entitled to a Class II permit under the 
current code because their project complied with all absolute policies (except 
"compatibility" under §5.6.3, (which is discussed later) and had a score of "zero or 
better" on relative policies as required by §5.2 (R p. 17, Exhibit B, p. 5-1). 
9. On August 28, 1990, the Planning Commission rejected the Stuckers' 
application because of "compatibility issues" (R p. 126). The requirement that a 
development be "compatible" is addressed in §5.6.3 et seq. of the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code (Exhibit B, p. 5-5). 
10. Under the Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985) and in order to 
satisfy "compatibility", any property owner must obtain a "consensus" of approval 
from their neighbors [(Deposition of Summit County Planning Director, (R pp. 80-
86)]. The Summit County Planning Director, however, does not know how the 
Summit County Planning Commission determines if a consensus is reached 
(R p.88). 
This concept of a consensus is supposed to be arrived at between the 
developer and the "affected property owners". The affected property owners are 
those living within 1,000 feet of the project (Deposition of Summit County Planning 
Director, R p. 89). If a "consensus" is not met an application for development or a 
building permit is denied. Only one of 24 "affected persons" objected to the 
Stuckers' project (R p. 58) though several other neighbors appeared before the 
Planning Commission to object to anything other than residential use (R p. 123). 
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All of the other property owners purchased their lots encumbered by restrictive 
covenants which specifically designated the Stuckers' lot as commercial (R p. 10). 
11. The Snyderville Basin Development Code provides in §4.1(a): 
"Class I development permits shall (emphasis added) be issued 
by the Planning Staff, unless the Planning Director determines it 
would be in the best interest of the public that a Class II permit be 
required through the Commission. 
There are no standards or criteria which delineate when a Class I permit 
would be issued or the matter would be referred to the Commission (R. p. 55). The 
"standard" use by the Planning Director to determine if a Class I permit is issued 
or the matter is referred to the Planning Commission is: 
"Is when the issue is not clear cut, simple, and when there is a 
considerable amount of interest in the project" (R. p.55) 
12. Subsequent to the denial of the building permit, the Stuckers 
exhausted their administrative remedies by appealing the decision to the Summit 
County Commission within the time provided by law. On or about October 3, 1990, 
the Summit County Commission upheld the denial and this action was properly 
commenced in the District Court within 60 days of that denial as specified in 
§4.9(7) Snyderville Basin Development Code. (Exhibit B, p. 4-5) 
X 
SUMMARY OF THE, ARGUMENT 
1. The zoning ordinance (Snyderville Basin Development Code) in effect 
at the time the Plaintiffs applied for a building permit specifically stated in §1.3 
and §4.1 that Plaintiffs had a vested right to the use of their lot in accordance with 
its zoning classification in effect at the time of the passage of the Development 
Code in 1985. It is undisputed that the lot was zoned "commercial" from 1964 until 
1985. 
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2. The county should be estopped from denying the Plaintiffs their 
building permit. The county received dedicated land; the zoning ordinances 
reserved and protected the commercial use; the county told the lot owner that the 
lot was commercial, and Plaintiffs relied upon these representations in 
purchasing the property for a specific project. 
3. Approval of a subdivision plat by a County includes the uses allowed 
on the lots within the subdivision. Refusal to allow the use of the lots as originally 
approved by the County constitutes an amendment to the subdivision plat and can 
only be done in conformance with state law and after a finding that no person will 
be materially injured. No such procedure or amendment was instituted in this 
case and the actions of the County in denying the building permit and changing 
the use of the lot was in direct violation of state statutes 
4. Under the existing Snyderville Basin Development Code, no building 
permit may be issued without a "consensus of compatibility" from the neighbors. 
This is an absolute requirement and the consent of neighbors is an impermissible 
requirement before a person may be allowed to build or otherwise utilize his 
property. 
5. There is an absolute requirement that a property owner convince a 
Summit County Planning Department or Planning Commission that a proposed 
land use is "compatible" under §5.6.3 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code 
(1985) before a permit may be issued. No person can know what his property can 
be used for prior to applying for a building permit; there are no standards or 
criteria to determine compliance; the actions of the Planning Department and 
Planning Director were arbitrary and capricious; the Defendants appear to 
utilize the abstract notion of compatibility to violate county and state law and 
impose their own feelings on property owners within the Snyderville Basin 
District. 
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XI 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTTITS WERE ENTITLED TO A BUILDING PERMIT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW SINCE THE USE APPLIED FOR: WAS IN STRICT CONFORMANCE 
WITH THE ZONING ORDINANCE IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF 
THEIR APPLICATION 
1. The Trial Court gave no explanation as to why he found the 
applicable Summit County zoning ordinances did not entitle the Plaintiffs to a 
commercial building permit (R p.288). The following facts are, however, 
undisputed: the Plaintiffs' lot, lot 225 of Highland Estates Subdivision Plat B, is in 
a subdivision which was filed in October, 1964 (R p.l); Summit County had no 
master plan nor zoning ordinance prior to 1977 (R pp.2, 33); the restrictive 
covenants of Highland Estates designate that this lot was to be used for 
commercial use (R p. 10) and the Summit County master plan, adopted in 1977, 
designated this and adjoining lots as commercial. At the time of the passage of 
the new Snyderville Basin Development Code in 1985, Summit County admits 
that: 
"Prior to the adoption of the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code in 1985, the parcel in question was zoned for commercial use" 
(Rp.157). 
2. On or about May, 1990, Plaintiffs met with the Summit County 
Planning Director, Mr. Jim Peterson, to apply for a permit to build and operate a 
small, auto repair shop on lot 225. Mr. Peterson originally prepared the 
application as a Class I permit for a new commercial use within a subdivision 
"platted and recorded prior to the adoption of the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code", pursuant to §4.1(a) (R. p 101, Exhibit B„ p. 4-1). 
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3. Plaintiffs requested approval under the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code (1977 as amended 1981) because the 1985 zoning ordinance 
specifically reserved that right for the application. §1.3 of the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code (1985) states: 
All presently existing County Regulations and Ordinances, except 
the Development Code of Summit County, to the extent of their 
inconsistency with this Code are repealed; provided however, any 
property within the Snyderville Basin Zoning District to which the 
Summit County Planning Commission has granted County Master 
Plan approval, mav, in its entirety, be developed exclusively under 
the provisions of (1) the Development Code of Summit County, or (2) 
this code (the Snyderville Basin Development Code), at the discretion 
of the developer. "A Statement of Intent" clarifying the "Continuing 
Effect" provision of this Code is attached). (Exhibit B, p 1-1). 
The Statement of Intent found immediately preceding this section states: 
The intent of this section is to allow continued development 
under the Development Code of Summit County (old code) of any 
property where development has had been initiated through master 
plan or zone change approval prior to the effective date of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code (new code). Examples of those 
"grandfathered" properties are currently identified as. but not limited 
to. (emphasis added), the following: (statement lists six projects 
which do not include Highland Estates and are attached hereto in 
Exhibit "A"). Developers of properties which are "grandfathered" 
have an option to either: (1) continue to develop under the provisions 
of the Old Code, or (2) to develop under the provisions of the New 
Code. When a project developer elects to proceed under the Old Code 
he will be permitted to continue development under the provisions of 
said Code. 
* * * 
In the event of the sale of all or any or part of the Grandfathered 
Property by the project developer, the purchaser also has the option to 
develop such part of the property purchased under the Old Code 
(emphasis added) or under the New Code. The election by such a 
purchaser to proceed with development under the Old Code or the 
New Code for the property purchased will not affect any election 
made by the seller for the remainder of the Grandfathered property. 
Likewise, any such election made by the seller with respect to the 
remainder of the Grandfathered property will not affect the election 
11 
by such a purchaser for the purchaser's portion of the Grandfathered 
property. 
Vested property rights may be created and protected by statute. 
Western Land Equities v. Citv of Logan. 617 P.2d. 388,395 (Utah, 1980). 
4. Stuckers attempted to make this election and there is no dispute that 
they would have been entitled to a permit under the old code. In response to a 
question directed to the Summit County Planning Director and assuming that the 
Stuckers' zone change had been "grandfathered" he stated: 
* * * 
"But if the assumption is that the zone change were 
grandfathered, under the old code, they could have gotten a building 
permit". (Rp. 99) 
The county, however, refused to follow their own ordinance and 
denied the Stuckers' request for a permit under the 1981 code. 
Mr. and Mrs. Stucker then requested that a Class I building permit 
be issued by the Planning Department. This request was also refused. §4.1 of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985) states: 
(a) A Class I development permit shall be required for: (1) 
all new commercial, industrial or inst i tut ional uses within 
subdivisions platted and recorded prior to the adoption of this code 
(emphasis added); . . . The purpose of the Class I development 
permit is to assure effective regulation of uses and structures which 
have not previously been reviewed for compliance with this Code, but 
are located either inside or outside of a previously approved 
subdivision. Class I development permits shall be issued by the 
Planning Staff, unless the Planning Director determines it would be 
in the best interest of the public that a Class II permit be required 
through the Commission. 
5. There is no written standard or set of circumstances dictating when 
the Class I permit would be issued by the staff or referred to the Commission 
(Deposition of Summit County Planning Director, p. 18, R. p. 74) 
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6. Mr. and Mrs. Stucker then completed the process for a Class II 
permit. This was denied. The Summit County Planning Director admitted that if 
the zone classification of the Stuckers' property was protected by the 
"Grandfathering provisions" of the Development Code, they should have received 
a building permit (R p. 77). 
7. Under the clear and unequivocal language of the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code (1985), the Stuckers were entitled to a building permit under 
the earlier code because their property rights were vested pursuant to the express 
terms of that code. §1.3 and the Statement of Intent specifically preserves the 
right to elect to develop under the Old Code, to not only the original developer, but 
any subsequent purchaser as to all or part of the project. Further, a vested right 
to utilize the property in a certain manner adheres to the land itself and is not 
forfeited by a subsequent buyer of the property who takes the property with 
knowledge of regulations which are inconsistent with the vested rights. Keith v. 
Saco River Corridor Commission. 486 A.2d. 150 (Me., 1983). 
8. Similar circumstances were analyzed in the case of Town of Seabrook 
v. Tra-Sea Corp.. 410 A.2d. 240 (NH, 1979), where a subdivision plat had been 
recorded in 1972 but the town contended that a subsequently enacted zoning 
ordinance, in 1974, prevented use of the lots because they lacked the necessary 
land area. The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated at page 242: 
"Because the lots are protected under the Grandfather clause, 
Tra-Sea may improve or sell them as a matter of right". Citing 
Anderson. Battcock v. Town of Rve. 116 NH 167, 355 A. 2d. 418 (1976); 
American Law of Zoning §9.62 (second ed. 1976); Bears v. Board of 
Adjustment. 75 NJ 305,183 A.2d. 130 (1962). 
If the lots are exempt, it was unnecessary for Tra-Sea to 
establish the existence of a vested right to all the lots or to satisfy 
standards for a variance by showing that the lots would be rendered 
valueless by the application of the lot size requirements contained in 
the Seabrook Zoning Ordinance. Graves v. Town of Bloomfield 
Planning Board. 97 supra, 306, 235 A.2d. 51 (1967). To interpret the 
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Grandfather clause as extending only to those showing a vested right 
or satisfying standards necessary for a variance would render the 
Grandfather clause meaningless and defeat its purpose specifically 
exempting non-conforming lots of record in existing subdivisions. 
The New Hampshire Court also ruled that construction of terms in a 
zoning ordinance is a matter of law and that zoning restrictions must be strictly 
construed so as to not impair incidences of ownership and the unfettered 
alienability of property. 
9. Even if the Grandfathering provisions of the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code (1985) did not apply to this property, under the rule adopted by 
this Court in Western Land Equities. Inc.. v. Citv of Logan. 617 P.2d. 388 (Utah, 
1980), the Stuckers have a protected right to utilize their lot in conformity with the 
use assigned at the time the subdivision was approved. When subdivisions are 
approved the governing body does more than simply allow for the division of 
property into smaller parcels. It receives title to roads and other utilities and 
services. The county also imposes other costs and requirements upon the 
developer. See Exhibit "A", Chapter 13 the Development Standards of Summit 
County (1977 as amended 1981). 
10. The lot in question has been a commercial lot since the inception of 
this subdivision 22 years ago. Certain county officials are, now, attempting to 
substitute their judgment for that of their predecessors or for other, 
unannounced, reasons trying to change this subdivision. The rule adopted by this 
Court in Western Land Equities. Inc.. v. Citv of Logan, supra, stated at page 396: 
"The above competing interests are best accommodated in our 
view by adopting the rule that an applicant is entitled to a building 
permit or subdivision approval (emphasis added) if the proposed 
development meets the zoning requirements in existence at the time 
of application and if it proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a 
compelling, countervailing public interest * * *." 
The County's attempt to alter its position is legally indefensible and 
void. 
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n 
SUMMIT COUNTY IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING STUCKERS A 
BUILDING PERMIT FOR A COMMERCIAL USE 
1. Plaintiffs' assertion in their pleadings that the County was estopped 
from denying them a building permit for a permitted, commercial use was an 
issue of fact precluding summary judgment. Ut. Rules Civ.P. 56(c). 
2. In addressing the application of zoning estoppel in Utah County v. 
Young. 615 P.2d. 1265 (Utah, 1980) the Supreme Court stated that zoning estoppel 
should be invoked when an act or omission occurs and the owner relys on this act 
and makes a substantial change in their position. 
3. This lot was approved by Summit County for commercial use in 1964. 
Subsequently enacted zoning ordinances recognized and preserved that use 
(Exhibit B, §1.3). The previous Planning Director, Jack Willis, wrote the party 
from whom the Plaintiffs purchased their lot and told him that the lot was to be 
used for commercial use and a change to single family residences would not be 
acceptable to the County (R p. 116). The Plaintiffs relied on this letter, as well as 
the clear language of the zoning ordinances when they decided to purchase the 
lot. §5.7.3(b) of the Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985) (Exhibit "B") 
designates this location at Silver Creek Junction as commercial and §4.1(a) 
reveals that in the worst case scenario, Stuckers were entitled to a Class I 
development permit for a commercial use "within subdivisions platted and 
recorded prior to the adoption of this case" (Exhibit B, §4.1). 
4. An attempt by North Salt Lake to accomplish a similar result as that 
being attempted by Summit County was rejected in Wood v. North Salt Lake. 15 
Utah 2d. 245, 390 P.2d. 858 (1964), where an enacted zoning ordinance was 
amended after subdivision approval to force the owners to enlarge the square 
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footage necessary to build on certain lots. As in this case, no compelling 
justification was given except the capricious actions of the county officials. In 
Wood the Court stated at page 860: 
"This ordinance, if sanctioned, easily could dry up the 
mortgage market for investors in platted subdivisions, could alienate 
title companies from insuring any lots therein, discourage purchase 
of lots, and long range subdivision development, impale title lawyers 
on the horns of a dilemma and lead to a policy of accepting plats, only 
to sanction their arbitrary rejection, if one chooses not to build on 
vacant property within the year. All of which this Court cannot deify. 
Therefore, we reverse with instructions to order the granting of the 
permit unless it is shown that other than that the only reason for its 
denial is the existence of the area ordinance, subject to this litigation,, 
5. There is also the factual issue whether Stuckers have a 
"contractually vested interest" which was noted by the Court in Western Land 
Equities. Inc.. v. Logan. 617 P.2d. 388 (Utah, 1980). What property the county 
received at the time of the subdivision plat, including dedicated roads and/or 
utilities is an issue of fact. When a dedication occurs, the rights to utilize the land 
in the subdivision in the manner in which the county approves the land division 
vests such uses in both the developer and any subsequent purchaser. Ward v. Citv 
ofNewRochelle. 197 NYS 2d. 54 (Sup. Ct., 1959); Mavor and Council of Baltimore. 
v. Crane. 354 Md. 198, 352 A.2d. 786 (1976). 
m 
SUMMIT COUNTY'S CHANGE OF USE OF A PLATTED SUBDIVISION 
CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL AMENDMENT OF THE SUBDIVISION 
CONTRARY TO §57-5-7.1 UCA (1953 AS AMENDED) AND 
§57-5-8 UCA (1953 AS AMENDED) 
1. When any subdivision is approved by the governing body of the 
County, the use of the property within the project is part of that approval. It is 
always the case that a subdivision is approved with open space, roads, areas for 
commercial or recreational development, dedication for public space and a 
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myriad of other zoning requirements (Exhibit A &B). When a subdivision is 
amended, more is accomplished than simply redrawing the lines on a mylar plat. 
The changes often alter the use or location of various activities; building density 
or public property which has been designated to exist within the bounds of the 
subdivision; location of streets, schools, trails, parking or other considerations 
inherent in the initial approval. 
2. In this action, the county approved the Highland Estates subdivision 
plat "B" with several lots bordering Silver Creek Junction designated for 
commercial use. They are now attempting to amend that subdivision plat under 
the guise of exercising their zoning authority without complying with the 
applicable state statutes. §57-5.7.1 UCA (1953 as amended) states: 
"A proposal by the governing body of a city or town or by a board 
of county commissioners to vacate, alter or amend a subdivision plat, 
portion of a subdivision plat, or any street, lot or alley contained in a 
subdivision plat shall be considered without petition at a public 
hearing, notice of which shall be given as provided in §57-5.7.5". 
3. It is uncontested that Summit County made no attempt to comply 
with this procedure and, in fact, did not go through any formalities to try and 
amend the Highland Estates plat "B" subdivision plat. In addition, the County 
must make a finding of no material injury in order to allow such amendment to 
proceed. §57-5-8 UCA (1953 as amended): 
"Within 30 days after the public hearing required by §57-5-5.5 
through 57-5-7.5, the city or town governing board, or the board of 
county commissioners shall consider the petition. If it is satisfied 
that neither the public nor any person will be materially injured by 
the proposed vacation, alteration or amendment, and that there is 
good cause for the vacation, alteration or amendment, it shall vacate, 
alter or amend the plat, any potion of the plat, or any street, lot, or 
alley in the manner that it considers appropriate". 
4. No action or procedure was instituted to amend this plat and the 
actions of the county to avoid the statutory procedures by surreptitiously saying 
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that the Plaintiffs needed zoning approval and that the project was not 
"compatible" was simply a charade to amend the subdivision plat without 
complying with the foregoing statutes. 
IV 
THE REQUIREMENT IN THE SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT 
CODE (1985) REQUIRING A LAND OWNER TO OBTAIN A "CONSENSUS" 
OF NEIGHBORS CONSTITUTES AN IMPERMISSIBLE CRITERION 
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A BUILDING PERMIT 
1. §5.6.3 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code (Exhibit "B") 
describes, in four pages, a mandatory requirement that anyone must satisfy in 
order to obtain a building permit in the Snyderville Basin. It is an absolute policy 
which everyone must meet if they want a Class I or Class II building permit 
(Deposition Summit County Planning Director, R pp. 78-79). The question then 
becomes, what is this mysterious function designated "compatibility'' and who 
makes the determination? It is submitted that it is, in fact, the neighbors who 
make the decision for zoning approval or denial 
2. In summary, the compatibility assessment provided for in §5.6.3 of 
the Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985) progresses down the following 
path: (Exhibit B, pp 5-5 to 5-8) 
1. Neighborhood meetings for the developer to meet with 
the neighbors. §5.6.3(1) 
2. The meetings shall consist of the neighbors, the 
planning staff and the developer and notice to any 
neighbor who lives within 1000 feet of the project. 
§5.6.3(2) 
3. The developer is to give a presentation to explain the 
proposed use and the various details of the project. 
§5.6.3(3) 
4. Topics which should be discussed between the developer 
and the neighbors (traffic, views, noise, lighting, water 
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run off, odor nuisance, pollution, privacy or change of 
character). §5.6.3(4) 
5. Relevant solutions in the event any of the topics in 
paragraph 4 create a problem. The solutions to be 
discussed are the specific topics of conversation reflected 
in the preceding sub-paragraph. §5.6.3(5) 
6. After the developer and the neighbors have had their 
exchange, the staff is to prepare a report on whether a 
"consensus" was reached and what conditions might be 
imposed. §5.6.3(6) 
7. Where the meeting between the developer and the 
neighbors does not result in a "consensus" the staff 
prepares a summation about where the developer and 
the neighbors do not agree and present that summation 
to the Planning Commission. §5.6.3(7) 
8. Where the developer and the neighbors do not reach a 
"consensus" a public hearing will be held. §5.6.3(8) 
9. The public hearing is to include affected property owners 
within 1000 feet, the developer, the Planning 
Commission and staff. §5.6.3(9) 
10. Topics of the public hearing shall be those addressed in 
§5.6.3 and subsections 4 and 5. §5.6.3(10) 
11. After the public hearing the commission will make a 
decision from three possible choices: §5.6.3(11) 
(a) the commission agrees with the developer that a 
permit should be issued; or 
(b) the commission agrees with the neighbors and 
requires the developer to take action to meet their 
demands; or 
(c) the commission agrees with the neighbors and 
believes their concerns cannot be met the project is 
denied. 
3. Besides the inherent ambiguity of determining what is "compatible" 
or whether a "consensus" is addressed, this provision of the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code (1985) turns the zoning power over to the neighbors with the 
Planning Department and Planning Commission acting as referee between two, 
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adversarial parties. Consent of neighboring land owners may not be made a 
condition for issuance of a building permit. Thurston v. Cache County. 628 P.2d. 
440 (Utah, 1981). This case fits squarely within the situation reviewed in Davis 
County v. Clearfield Citv. 756 P.2d. 704 (CA, Utah, 1988- tating that "public 
clamor" is not an adequate, legal basis to deny a building permit. 
4. Stuckers submit that the record unequivocally supports that after the 
County rejected Plaintiffs' right to develop under the Old Code; rejected their 
request they had a vested right to the commercial use in existence since 1964; and 
rejected their request for a permit as a new commercial use in an existing 
subdivision under §4.1(a) of the Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985, Exhibit 
"B"), that they would have received a Class II building permit except for the fact 
that Summit County utilized the clamor of the neighbors to decry this project as 
"incompatible" and deny it. The legal deficiencies of this situation were set forth 
in the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
are repeated here. 
5. In attempting to ferret out what one must do to satisfy the "consensus 
of compatibility", the Plaintiffs took the deposition of the director of the Summit 
County Planning Office, pages of which were at tached to Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and are found in the 
record at pages 74 to 100. Mr. Peterson stated: 
Q Could you explain to me compatibility assessment? 
A Its one of the absolute policies in the Snyderville Basin Code 
and it's-it looks totally at the compatibility situation and 
assesses it through public input. 
Q Sounds like zoning by neighbor, but is that-
A That's your phrase. 
Q You said they assess it through public input. I mean, is it the 
neighbors who are determining it or is there a separate set of 
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criteria that is looked at by either yourself or the county 
officials to assess it? 
A I think the first paragraph explains the-not the purpose of 
assessing it, but how it comes about, and then also listed in 
that same section are different potential compatibility issues 
that the staff may want to refer to at the compatibility meeting. 
* * * 
Q It is ever possible to assess compatibility before submitting a 
building application? I'm sorry, development permit 
application? 
A No. (emphasis added) 
* * * 
Q Looking at Exhibit 4, Mr. Peterson, on the first page "General 
Information Summary" under "recommendation/findings" 
there is a reference here, and let me show it to you, that a 
consensus was not met. My question is, what does that mean? 
A At the compatibility meeting that was held and conducted by 
the staff, the meeting did not adjourn with everybody there 
being either for or against it. 
Q So the numbers of people participating determine-
A No. It's that issue was not resolved. 
Q So if there is one versus fifty, a consensus is not reached? 
A Oh, I- it's too general. I couldn't comment on that. 
Q Well, is it fifteen, ten, or is there any number? 
A Your creating a circumstance that you kind of have to be there 
to believe it. Your just creating a circumstance that I can't 
respond to. 
Q Well, explain to me the guidelines or anything that you use in 
determining or defining when a consensus has met or not met. 
How do you do it? 
A When those that are at the meeting either are clearly on one 
side or the other. 
* * * 
Q Are you going to tell me that the more people I bring, the better 
off I'm going to be getting a consensus, or that it doesn't 
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matter, or that I'm just going to play it like I feel it, or any of 
the above? 
A No. There has to be a clear consensus that everybody there at 
the meeting hasn't reached an agreement one way or the 
other. 
* * * 
Q Do you have any idea how the Planning Commission 
determines whether there is a consensus or not? 
A I£Q. (Emphasis added) 
6. As explained by Mr. Peterson, in order to comply with the absolute 
policy of compatibility, anyone requesting a building permit must obtain a 
consensus of approval from neighboring property owners. Presumably, that 
means neighbors living within 1000 feet as defined by §5.6.3 (1)(2) Snyderville 
Basin Development Code (1985). In the case of the Stuckers, the meeting to assess 
a "consensus of compatibility" was held before the Summit County Planning 
Commission, August 28, 1990. The minutes demonstrate nine people appeared to 
object. (R p. 122). Only one of those people was listed as an "affected owner" living 
within 1000 feet (Mr. Butts) (R p.129). 
This provision is not designed to provide legitimate input from 
neighbors regarding a project which may affect their community. §5.6.3 of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code sets up an adversarial process between a 
developer and the neighbors with the Planning Department and Planning 
Commission acting as judges. If differences are not resolved the permit is 
denied. This gives neighbors impermissible veto power over the issuance of any 
building permit in the Snyderville Basin. Contracts Funding v. Mavne. 527 P.2d. 
1073 (Utah, 1974); Davis County v. Clearfield Citv. 754 P.2d. 704 (C.A. Utah, 1988). 
22 
V 
PLAINTIFFS' PERMIT WAS DENIED IN AN ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS AND DISCRIMINATORY FASHION 
1. Plaintiffs do not contend that the entire Snyderville Basin Code is 
invalid or perpetuates the discriminatory application which they suffered at the 
hands of Summit County. Plaintiffs do, however, contend that §5.6.3 of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985) and its subsections abdicates veto 
power to the neighbors and is so vague as to be unenforceable. It is, also, 
arbitrarily applied to reject projects for personal or illegitimate reasons. While 
performance or point zoning has been upheld by this Court IThurston v. Cache 
County. 626 P.2d. 440 (Utah, 1981)] this amorphous, compatibility requirement 
was not part of that review. 
2. It should be emphasized that the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code (1985) addresses improvements and facilities which a person would have to 
have to build on his lot in other sections: §5.6.1 lists environmental criteria 
including air and water quality, sewage disposal, slopes and avalanche problems. 
§5.6.2 addressed geologic hazards and avalanches. §5.6.4 address utilities, 
sewers, waste disposal, fire protection, roads, water systems and ingress and 
egress. It also addresses curb and gutter, parking, trail system utility corridors 
and parking areas. §5.6.5 addresses frontage, building height, screening and 
signs. §5.7.1 speaks of water quality, erosion, soil and wildlife. §5.7.2 restricts 
building within flood plains, critical slopes or visually sensitive areas. §5.7.3 
governs where commercial activities should occur. §5.7.4 provides design 
criteria. §5.7.5 traffic and access, etc. Other provisions provide for density and 
multi-family situations. "Compatibility" is a separate demon. 
3. All of the items which are to be considered in determining 
compatibility under §5.6.3(4) (Exhibit "B", page 5.6) are either required as absolute 
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policy or addressed elsewhere in the code. That is, any person requesting a 
building permit must satisfy the county that the requirements for these services 
or restrictions have been met prior to obtaining a permit exclusive of his building 
plans being "compatible"? 
4. The reason the Stuckers did not receive a Class I building permit was 
because the county Planning Director determined that their proposal had not met 
the compatibility requirements (R p.76). The Planning Director simply decided 
that compatibility had not been met but made no determination as to which issues 
of compatibility were not met (R p. 77). 
5. It should also be noted that the Stuckers did not receive a Class I 
building permit because the Planning Director and the Planning Staff were 
operating under a misapprehension of the law. It was the Planning Director's 
opinion that there was no master plan in effect between 1982 and 1985. Mr. 
Peterson testified at page 67 of his deposition (R p. 93) that the master plan map 
passed in conjunction with the Development Code of Summit County "was 
effectively nullified in 1982". Mr. Peterson stated at page 67 (R p. 93): 
"Because this (master plan) was effectively nullified in '82, and 
then in '85, a brand new code was implemented in that section of the 
County". 
When asked why he believed there was no master plan he mistakenly 
opined that the Planning Commission did not have a review and sign the master 
plan and it was nullified (R p.94) because: 
"They had a provision that they had to annually review it and 
sign it, approve it, and they did so annually from '79, but in '82, was 
the last year they reviewed it and signed it and kept it official". 
This conclusion by Mr. Peterson is absolutely false and unsupported 
by any ordinance. He simply conjured up a non-existent requirement and then 
concluded there was no master plan prior to 1985 and, therefore, there was no 
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zone to which the grandfathering provision of the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code (1985) would refer. He made no attempt to verify this conclusion, which is 
false, and forced the Stuckers to proceed through an expensive and time 
consuming process because there were certain members of the staff who were 
arbitrarily out to deny this permit application. 
6. According to Mr. Peterson, it is never possible to assess compatibility 
prior to submitting a building application (R p.82). The Summit Coimty Planning 
Director or Planning Staff defines compatibility (R p.84) "when those that are at 
the meeting either are clearly on one side or the other". He then went on to say 
that even if a majority of people who appeared were in favor of a project it might 
not be compatible because there would be 49% in opposition (R p.85). Mr. Peterson 
also stated that he had no idea how the Planning Commission determined 
whether there was a consensus of compatibility or if Stuckers had any idea how 
the Planning Commission came to this conclusion. It is submitted to this Court 
that a review of the portions of Mr. Peterson's deposition found in the record at 
pages 74 to 100 demonstrate the slight of hand maneuvering that the respondents 
utilized under the guise of §5.6.3 to effectuate their own result without regard to 
the people whom they serve. 
7. The minutes of the Planning Commission meeting on August 28, 
1990, wherein the Stuckers request for a Class II building permit was finally 
denied, are found in the record at pages 123 to 126. The minutes reflect the 
following opinions of the Planning Commission: 
1. "Commissioner Crandall said the lot in question can be 
used for commercial because he feels the lot is within the Silver 
Creek Commercial node, the CC&R's indicate it is commercial 
property, and the letter from the previous Planning Director also says 
it is commercial. 
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2. Commissioner Shafkind reads §5.6.3(ii). He said he does 
not hear a consensus of compatibility from the neighbors and does 
not feel that compatibility issues can be resolved. 
3. Commissioner Glasmann said the road is an issue of 
incompatibility. 
4. County Commissioner Soter moved to deny the project 
because of compatibility issues". 
8. §5.6.3(ii)(b)(c) Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985) (Exhibit B) 
states that when the commission agrees with the neighbors' complaints they 
should require measures to bring the project into a compatible state and state 
their reasons. If the project cannot be made acceptable to the neighbors, they 
should state their reasons why. One member of the Planning Commission voted 
to approve the project. One member said that the road was an issue of 
compatibility but, in fact, access and roads are addressed as separate 
requirements in §5.6.4 and 5.7.5 Snyderville Basin Development Code (1985). The 
other commissioners just said it was "incompatible" and no reasons were given. 
9. The application of this particular section is a charade which allows 
neighbors and/or the Planning Department of the county to impede or nullify 
anyone's property rights by simply saying it is incompatible. In Western Land 
Equities. Inc. v. Citv of Lopan. 617 P.2d. 388 (Utah, 1980) 
* * * 
"It is incumbent upon a city, however, to act in good faith and 
not to reject an application because the application itself triggers 
zoning reconsiderations that result in a substitution of the judgment 
of current city officials for that of their predecessors". 
See also Wood v. North Salt Lake. 15 Utah 2d. 245, 390 P.2d. 858 (1964); 
Thurston v. Cache County. 656 P.2d. 440 (Utah, 1981); Davis County v. Clearfield 
Citv. 756 P.2d. 704 (C.A. Utah, 1988); Town of Seabrook v. Tra-Sea Corn. 410 A.2d. 
240 (NH, 1979). 
10. The Plaintiffs were the victims of this arbitrary and capricious action 
on behalf of Summit County and the incoherent provision in the Snyderville Basin 
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Development Code (1985) allowing county officials to deny someone a permit to 
utilize their property because it is "incompatible". This denies land owners the 
right to have any reasonable expectation of what their property may be used for 
before submitting application for a specific permit and allows arbitrary denial of 
land use for any reason, including personal motivation on the part of the 
individual members. 
XII 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs request this Court for the following relief: 
1. Enter an Order Directing Summit County to issue a building permit 
to the Plaintiffs in conformance with the existing Summit County Development 
Code (1985). 
2. Enter an Order that Summit County is estopped or otherwise 
prevented from denying the Stuckers a building permit. 
3. Enter an Order that §5.6.3 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code 
(1985) is void and that Summit County has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
the application of this section and order that the Plaintiffs receive their building 
permit. 
4. Remand this case for the Trial Court to decide the disputed issues of 
fact and enter appropriate findings and conclusions thereon. 
DATED this 2S*^ day of July, 1992. 
Robert Felton 
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